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MISSOURI UPS THE ANTE IN THE DRUG FORFEITURE
"RACE TO THE RES...
I. INTRODUCTION
Forfeiture of property under federal law2 is big business? To the
chagrin of state lawmakers, the principal beneficiaries of the federal
forfeiture bounty have been state and local law enforcement agencies.4 In
order to increase their share of the asset forfeiture windfall, many states
have enacted forfeiture provisions designed to supplant federal domination
of this lucrative source of revenue.5 In July 1993, Missouri followed suit
by enacting one of the nation's most stringent state forfeiture statutes.6
Missouri's forfeiture statute ensures a one hundred percent return for the
state on seizures conducted pursuant to state authority by preventing federal
1. In United States v. Alston, 717 F. Supp. 378 (M.D.N.C. 1989), the court described the
competition for forfeiture assets between state and federal governments as "the unseemly race to the
res." Id. at 380.
2. Federal law provides for both criminal and civil forfeiture. Criminal forfeitures under 18
U.S.C. § 982 (1988) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988) are in personam proceedings imposed as punishment
upon conviction. The majority of civil forfeitures are brought under 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988) and 21
U.S.C. § 881 (1988). Section 981 provides for seizure of assets related in some manner to money
laundering, currency transaction reporting violations, or banking law violations. Section 881 provides
for seizure of assets related to violations of federal drug laws.
3. See Justice Forfeiture Fund Holds 32,000 Properties, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Aug. 1993,
at 3 [hereinafter 32,000 Properties] ("The inventory of property, including cash, exceeds 32,000 items
worth $1.9 billion. That includes about 5,000 real properties and businesses worth $886 million and
8,000 cash cases worth $670 million.").
4. Justice Adopts New Code of Ethics in Forfeiture Cases, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Apr.
1993, at 3 [hereinafter Justice Adopts New Code]. Over 3,000 state and local agencies have received
in excess of S.L1 billion in seized assets distributed by the federal government pursuant to equitable
sharing programs. Id. In 1992 alone, the federal government distributed over $236 million to state and
local agencies that assisted in federal forfeiture proceedings. 32,000 Properties, supra note 3, at 3.
5. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 161.555(1) (West 1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para.
712(d), 712(0(3) (1989); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 167 (West 1991). For further discussion of state
statutory forfeiture provisions, see infra Part II.
6. Missouri House Bill 562, H.R. 562, 87th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1993), established a new set
of provisions governing forfeiture. These provisions are codified at Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 513.647-.653
(Vernon Supp. 1994).
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"adoption" 7 of those seizures. 8 Missouri's forfeiture law is also noteworthy
because it purports to encompass even those seizures conducted by state
and local law enforcement officers pursuant to federal judicial search
warrants or as part of a federal investigation. 9
This Recent Development discusses the purpose, function and, validity
of the recently enacted Missouri forfeiture provisions. Part I reviews the
evolution of federal forfeiture as a drug interdiction tool. Part II analyzes
the conflict between competing federal and state forfeiture provisions. Part
III examines Missouri's new forfeiture legislation. Part IV ultimately
concludes that Missouri's new forfeiture statute impermissibly frustrates
Congress' intent to facilitate cooperative enforcement of federal drug laws.
Thus, Missouri's provision is repugnant to the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution.
A. Federal Drug Forfeiture
In 1970, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control
Act (CDACA),' ° which authorizes the use of civil forfeiture actions"
7. Prior to the passage of House Bill 562, state or local law enforcement authorities in Missouri
would surrender seized assets to a federal agency to initiate federal forfeiture proceedings. Then, acting
pursuant to an "equitable sharing agreement," the federal agency would "adopt" the state seizure and
eventually remit up to 85% of the proceeds to the local or state agency responsible for the seizure. In
this manner, Missouri's jurisdiction over forfeitures was effectively bypassed. Judicial validation of this
practice provided a strong incentive for Missouri to enact more stringent forfeiture provisions. See, e.g.,
United States v. $12,390.00, 956 F.2d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that federal adoption of a
seizure made by the St. Louis Police Department preempts state jurisdiction). For a discussion of
$12,390.00, see infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
8. For the full text of Missouri's anti-adoption statute, see infra note 96.
9. For the language of Missouri's preemption provision, see infra note 97.
10. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511,
94 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1988)).
11. The term "forfeiture" has been explained as follows:
[Forfeiture is the] [d]ivestiture without compensation of property used in a manner contrary
to the laws of the sovereign. Whenever a statute provides that upon the commission of a
specified act, certain property used in or connected with the act shall be "forfeited," the
forfeiture takes place upon the commission of the act, and a conditional right to the property
then vests in the government.
United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193, 195 n.l (C.D. Cal. 1978).
For an overview of the historical development of American forfeiture provisions, see Damon G.
Saltzburg, Note, Real Property Forfeitures as a Weapon in the Government's War on Drugs: A Failure
to Protect Innocent Ownership Rights, 72 B.U. L. REV. 217, 220 (1992); and Michael Schecter, Note,
Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1153-55 (1990). A
comprehensive history of forfeiture law can be found in Jacob J. Finklestein, The Goring Ox: Some
Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of
Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169 (1973).
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against any property used or acquired in violation of federal drug laws. 2
Despite being heralded as the ideal weapon for combatting sophisticated
criminal enterprises, the CDACA initially failed to meet Congress'
expectations. 3 Subsequent amendments have significantly expanded the
reach of the CDACA.14
Codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881, the federal drug forfeiture statute provides
that any asset with a tangential connection to drug trafficking is subject to
civil forfeiture. 5 Section 881 forfeiture actions are common because of
the relative ease with which they are initiated. Because § 881 provides for
in rem proceedings against the property itself,'6 no underlying criminal
activity on the part of the owner need be alleged. 7 The forfeiture occurs
at the moment of illegal use.'
To commence a forfeiture proceeding, the government must make a
12. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988). The initial focus of the Act was to seize the illicit profits of
organized crime syndicates. United States v. One 1972 Datsun Vehicle, 378 F. Supp. 1200, 1205
(D.N.H. 1974). Congress has expanded the scope of the CDACA considerably in subsequent amend-
ment:. See infra note 14.
13. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1983). The General Accounting Office cited
three major faults in the 1970 Act: (1) federal law enforcement agencies had not aggressively pursued
forfeitures due to escalating costs; (2) inherent limitations and ambiguities in the Act impeded its use
as an effective law enforcement tool; and (3) the scope of property subject to forfeiture was too limited.
Id. at 191-94.
14. In 1978, Congress amended the CDACA by enacting § 881(a)(6), which provided for the
forfeiture of money, negotiable instruments, securities, and other things of value either used in exchange
for a controlled substance or to facilitate a violation of the CDACA. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988).
The Crime Control Act of 1984 added two additional provisions to § 881. First, § 881(a)(7) added
real property to the list ofitems subject to forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). Second, § 881(h)
added the relation-back doctrine which vests in the United States all right, title and interest in any
property described under subsection (a) upon commission of the act giving rise to the forfeiture. 21
U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Subsequent amendments in 1988 and 1990 added controlled
substances, drug manufacturing equipment, drug paraphernalia, and firearms to the list of forfeitable
items. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(8)-(11) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
15. Items subject to forfeiture include: controlled substances, their containers, conveyances used
to transport illegal drugs, money and securities, real property, drug manufacturing equipment and
paraphernalia, and firearms. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(l)-(ll) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
16. An in rem proceeding is instituted "against the thing" (in this context, the res) to enforce a
right in the thing itselt BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 900 (6th ed. 1990). For a discussion of the use
of in rem proceedings in civil forfeiture, see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
683 (1974).
17. Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 222 n.31 (stating that "the innocence or guilt of the owner is not
an issue in civil forfeiture proceedings"); Patricia M. Canavan, Note, Civil Forfeiture of Real Property:
The Government's Weapon Against Drug Traffickers Injures Innocent Owners, 10 PACE L. REv. 485,
492 (1990) ("The government does not have to convict or even charge the owner of the seized property
with a crime. ... ").
18. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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showing of probable cause. 9 The burden then shifts to the claimant of
the property 0 to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that the
property was not used or intended to be used illegally, or that the property
is statutorily excepted.2' If the claimant fails to prevail on either of these
narrow defenses, automatic forfeiture ensues.
B. Federal Drug Interdiction Policies
Prior to 1988, federal anti-drug enforcement efforts were primarily
directed against large wholesale and retail suppliers.22 Discouraged by the
ineffectiveness of that approach,23 the Reagan Administration implemented
a "zero tolerance"24 policy in March of 1988. The zero tolerance policy
expanded the scope of drug enforcement efforts by targeting drug users as
well as drug dealers.' Under this new policy, the number of federal
forfeiture proceedings increased dramatically. In the first six weeks
following implementation of the zero tolerance policy, customs officials
seized 1,135 conveyances valued at more than $12 million.26 Disgruntled
property owners found the policy tyrannical, and horror stories of
disproportionate seizures were commonplace.27
19. United States v. Certain Real Property, 986 F.2d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
requisite showing of probable cause requires "a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, supported by less
than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion") (citations omitted).
20. United States v. $22,287.00, 709 F.2d 442, 446 (6th Cir. 1983).
21. The statute creates exceptions for conveyances used by a common carrier, stolen conveyances,
and innocent owners. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(A)-(C) (1988).
22. The Reagan Administration's initial interdiction efforts were supply-side oriented, designed
to intercept the drugs before they reached the retail market. Schecter, supra note 11, at 1152.
23. Initial enforcement successes in south Florida were more than offset by increased drug traffic
in other areas of the nation. See Mark Starr & Elaine Shannon, Reagan's War on Drugs, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 9, 1982, at 14.
24. President Reagan's cabinet-level National Drug Policy Board endorsed significant additional
penalties for possession of even minuscule amounts of drugs. The Board's recommendations included
suspension of driver licenses and reduction of federal college and housing subsidies for individuals
caught using drugs. Charles Rangel, Reagan's "Zero Tolerance" is a Zero Drug Polic, NEWSDAY,
June 28, 1988, at 66 (editorial).
25. See Schecter, supra note 11, at 1252; Richard Lacayo, A New Mission Impractical. Zero
Tolerance for Users, TIME, May 30, 1988, at 18. The zero tolerance policy was recommended to the
White House by then U.S. Customs Commissioner William von Raab. Von Raab stated that the
purpose of the new policy was to put pressure on drug users who would ordinarily go unpunished due
to the government's failure to prosecute. Lacayo, supra, at 18.
26. Jon Nordheimer, Tighter Federal Drug Dragnet Yields Cars, Boats and Protests, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 1988, at Al.
27. In one instance, a car was impounded after customs inspectors used tweezers to remove one-
tenth of a gram of marijuana from the bottom of the driver's purse. Nordheimer, supra note 26, at Al.
Another car was seized based upon a customs inspector's belief that he smelled the lingering aroma of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/40
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Reacting to these perceived abuses, and anticipating a Supreme Court
decision restricting the permissible scope of federal seizures,28 the
Department of Justice promulgated a code of ethics to regulate the actions
of law enforcement personnel in forfeiture cases.29 In addition, congres-
sional legislation has been proposed that would significantly change the
drug forfeiture statute by increasing the government's burden of proof in
forfeiture proceedings to a clear and convincing evidence standard.3" In
spite of these reform efforts, forfeiture remains a fertile source of conflict.
II. THE "RACE TO THE RES"-CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL FORFEITURE PROVISIONS
A. Equitable Sharing Programs
To the chagrin of the beneficiaries of state forfeiture laws, the federal
forfeiture campaign continues to net enormous windfalls for state and local
law enforcement agencies. As of April 1993, over $1.1 billion had been
distributed to more than 3,000 agencies31 through equitable sharing
programs." The goal of these programs is threefold: (1) to punish and
deter criminal activity; (2) to enhance cooperation among federal, state and
local law enforcement agencies; and (3) to produce revenues to enhance
marijuana in the car's interior. Id. More substantial seizures included a $2.5 million yacht and an $80
million research vessel belonging to Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution seized after traces of
marijuana were found in the shaving kit of a crew member. Id.
Federal authorities continue to expand the reach of the drug forfeiture statute. Prosecutors recently
brought criminal forfeiture proceedings against two law firms alleged to have taken part in a marijuana
smuggling ring masterminded by a former client. Mark Hansen, Law Firm Forfeitures Sought, A.B.A.
J., Nov. 1993, at 14.
28. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2801 (1993) (holding that in rem civil forfeitures
predicated on violation of the federal drug laws are subject to the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines
clause).
29. Justice Adopts New Code, supra note 4, at 3. The new provisions require a finding of
probable cause prior to initiation seizures, as well as adequate notice and prompt resolution of claims.
Id. See also the discussion of the new Department of Justice Guidelines for adoptive forfeitures infra
note 93.
30. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 2417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
31. 32,000 Properties, supra note 3, at 3. Other major recipients of forfeited assets include federal
agencies ($70 million) and foreign governments ($12.4 million). Id.
32. Equitable sharing programs were developed in accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A),
which provides that the Attorney General may transfer forfeited property "to any State or local law
enforcement agency which participated directly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property." 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(e)(l)(A) (1988).
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forfeiture efforts and strengthen law enforcement. 3 Equitable sharing
programs have significantly enhanced drug interdiction efforts.3 4 Howev-
er, this success creates tension between state and local law enforcement
agencies and the beneficiaries of state forfeiture provisions, who are
bypassed when federal authorities adopt state seizures.35
State and local law enforcement agencies are eligible to participate in
equitable sharing programs in two ways. First, they may assist a designat-
ed federal agency in the investigation or prosecution of violations of federal
law that provide for forfeiture as a remedy.36 Second, a state or local law
enforcement agency may seize property independently and request that a
designated federal agency adopt the seizure and commence administrative
forfeiture proceedings.37 Absent legislation establishing prior exclusive
33. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNITED STATES ATrORNEY GENERAL, THE A1rORNEY GENERAL'S
GUIDELINES ON SEIZED AND FORFEITED PROPERTY (1990).
34. During the 1987-1991 period, equitable sharing programs facilitated a twenty-fold increase in
the amount of funds seized by state and local law enforcement agencies nationwide. Tim Poor &
Louis J. Rose, Police Cooperate With Feds on Seizures, ST. LOUiS POST DISPATCH, May 5, 1991, at
IA. In addition, the redistribution of assets has improved historically mistrustful relations among local
and federal law enforcement agencies. Id. Municipal police have embraced the sharing programs
wholeheartedly. See Gordon Witkin, Hitting Kingpins in Their Assets, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Dec. 5, 1988, at 20. Citing the inadequacy of California forfeiture laws, a Los Angeles Police
Department Deputy Chief remarked: "We wouldn't have a war on drugs in Los Angeles if it weren't
for equitable sharing .... This program is the greatest thing that ever happened to local law
enforcement." Id.
35. 1 DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES 7-9 (1993).
36. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING OF FEDERALLY FORFEITED
PROPERTY FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1-2 (1990) [hereinafter EQUITABLE
SHARNa GUIDE].
37. Id. at 2. The designated federal agencies involved in the Department of Justice Forfeiture
Program include: the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Postal Inspection
Service, and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Id.
In addition to the statutory requirements, property in adoptive cases is generally subject to the
following minimum monetary thresholds:
Conveyances:
Vehicles $ 3,500
Vessels $10,000
Aircraft $10,000
Real Property:
Land and any $20,000 or 20% of the appraised
improvements value, whichever is greater
All Other Property:
Currency, $2,000
bank accounts,
monetary
instruments,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/40
19941 MISSOURI DRUG FORFEITURE STATUTE 1475
state jurisdiction, a federal agency may adopt state seizures at any time.3"
This preemption of state authority is a significant source of tension between
constituencies vying for the drug forfeiture dividend.
Both federal and state forfeiture provisions place limitations upon the use
of forfeited property. The federal provisions require that the assets
distributed through equitable sharing programs be used to supplement,
rather than supplant, existing law enforcement resources.39 If agencies
comply with these limited requirements, they are eligible to receive up to
eighty-five percent of the net proceeds in an adoptive case.4" In contrast,
the majority of state forfeiture provisions earmark forfeiture proceeds for
support of public education." In order to avoid losing this lucrative
source of discretionary funding to education, state and local police
departments will often allow federal agencies to adopt their seizures, even
when state law prohibits federal adoption.4' This tactic undermines the
goals of equitable sharing programs by promoting a "foot race" between
federal agencies and state governments to establish jurisdiction over assets
subject to forfeiture.43
jewelry, etc.
CARY H. COPELAND, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DIRECTIVE No. 93-1 (Jan. 15, 1993), reprinted
in I SMITH, supra note 35, at 7-42 to 7-46.
38. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.91(1) (1990).
39. See EQUITABLE SHARING GUIDE, supra note 36, at 4 (listing permissible agency uses of
forfeiture assets, all related to improving law enforcement).
40. Id. at 6. State and local agencies receive an 85% distribution when assets are forfeited
administratively or in uncontested judicial proceedings. Id. In contested judicial proceedings, the
portion of the proceeds allocated for sharing drops to 80%. Id. In joint participation cases, the
percentage is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id.
41. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 7 (providing that all proceeds from state forfeitures are to be
distributed to the schools); N.C. CONST. art IX, § 7 (same); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 161.55(5)(b) (West
1989) (stating that fifty percent of forfeiture assets shall be deposited in the school fund).
In Missouri's 1990-1991 fiscal year, schools statewide received $18 million from the state forfeiture
fund. Fred W. Lindecke, Lawmakers Disagree on Ways to Split Drug Forfeiture Proceeds, ST. LOUIs
POST DISPATCH, Mar. 28, 1993, at 5B. This amount included money from seizures, as well as civil and
criminal fines. Id. If Missouri is able to reduce the number of federal adoptions through enactment
of its anti-adoption statute, the funding available for public education is likely to increase dramatically.
The debate over the allocation of drug forfeiture is extremely controversial. See id. (reporting a heated
debate between Missouri State Representatives Jacob and Whitten).
42. See, e.g., United States v. One 1979 Chevrolet C-20 Van, 924 F.2d 120, 122-23 (7th Cir.
1991) (criticizing the local police department's "routine and administrative" disregard of a state statute
prohibiting adoptions).
43. Id. at 122.
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B. Competing Federal and State Jurisdiction
Under the common law rule of prior exclusive state jurisdiction, a federal
court may not assert in rem jurisdiction over a res already subject to a state
court's jurisdiction." Thus, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over
in rem forfeiture actions when a prior forfeiture action is underway in state
court.45 However, federal jurisdiction is routinely established by filing a
peremptory federal forfeiture action, because adoptions are often completed
before state judges and prosecutors are aware that a seizure has occurred.46
1. Prior Exclusive State Jurisdiction
Federal courts have generally upheld the rule of prior exclusive state
jurisdiction. In United States v. $79,123.49,47 the State of Wisconsin
initiated forfeiture proceedings in state court against currency used to
purchase marijuana from an undercover state agent.48 The court ultimate-
ly dismissed the case for failure to comply with a Wisconsin time limitation
and ordered the money returned to the claimants.49 The next day, while
the state court's order was pending, federal authorities filed an action
44. Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 189, 195 (1935) (holding that "the court
first assuming jurisdiction over the property may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion
of the other"); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221 (1960) ("The very essence of a
healthy federalism depends upon the avoidance of needless conflict between state and federal courts."),
The rule seeks "[t]o avoid unseemly and disastrous conflicts in the administration of our dual judicial
system, and to protect the judicial processes of the court first assuming jurisdiction." Penn General,
294 U.S. at 195 (citations omitted). Although detestable because the "property" involved were slaves,
Hagan v. Lucas, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 400 (1836), provides additional historical precedent for the principle:
"A most injurious conflict ofjurisdiction would be likely, often, to arise between the federal and the
state courts, if the final process of the one could be levied on property which had been taken by the
process of the other." Id. at 402.
45. See infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text. However, if the state forfeiture action is a
criminal in personam proceeding, federal and state actions may proceed simultaneously. United States
v. One 1986 Chevrolet Van, 927 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Winston-
Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Edue., 902 F.2d 267, 271 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. $79,123.49,
830 F.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1987).
46. See infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
47. 830 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1987).
48. Id. at 95. The seizure was made pursuant to Wlis, STAT. ANN. § 161.555(1), which provided:
"An action brought to cause the forfeiture of property seized under [§] 161.555 is an action in rem.
The circuit court for the county in which the property was seized shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
any proceedings regarding the property." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 161.555(1) (west 1989). Section 161.555
was later amended to provide for in personam actions against the defendant. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 161.555 (West Supp. 1993).
49. 830 F.2d at 95.
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against the currency under 21 U.S.C. § 881,50 and placed it in a federal
asset forfeiture fund.' The district court ruled that the federal authorities
acquired exclusive jurisdiction when they obtained possession of the
assets. 2 Drawing upon the holdings of Penn General and its progeny,53
the Seventh Circuit vacated the decision of the district court.54 Because
both forfeiture proceedings were in rem, the Seventh Circuit held that the
Wisconsin court's assertion of jurisdiction trumped any subsequent
assertion of federal jurisdiction."
In United States v. One 1985 Cadillac Seville,56 the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the Seventh Circuit and held that prior assertion of state
jurisdiction negated any subsequent federal claim.5 7  In One 1985
Cadillac, the District Attorney of Santa Cruz County filed an action for
forfeiture"t eight days before the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
initiated federal forfeiture proceedings. 9 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
absent "some affirmative act of abandonment" by the state, state jurisdic-
tion was proper.6" In response to the argument that the state executive
50. Section 881(a)(6) provides in relevant part that "[a]ll moneys... furnished or intended to be
furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance" are subject to forfeiture. 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6) (1988).
51. $79,123.49, 830 F.2d at 96.
52. Id.
53. See supra note 44.
54. 830 F.2d at 99. The district court judge had reasoned incorrectly that the state court's
continuing jurisdiction was in personam, rather than in rem. Id. at 96.
55. The Seventh Circuit rejected the United States' argument that its mere possession of the res
established federal jurisdiction. The court concluded: "[P]ossession obtained through an invalid seizure
neither strips the first court of jurisdiction nor vests it in the second. To hold otherwise would
substitute a rule of force for the principle of mutual respect embodied in the prior exclusive jurisdiction
doctrine." 830 F.2d at 98 (citation omitted).
See also United States v. One 1979 Chevrolet C-20 Van, 924 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1991). In One
1979 Chevrolet C-20 Van, the Seventh Circuit also denied federal jurisdiction over assets subject to
forfeiture even though the filed state action had been dismissed. Id. at 123. The court held that the
authorities were bound by applicable state forfeiture provisions "to seek a turnover order from the
circuit court of the county in which the van was seized." Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para.
712(d) (1989)).
56. 866 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1989). The caption of the case is misleading because the significant
property at issue was $434,097.00 in cash. Id. at 1144.
57. Id. at 1145.
58. Id. at 1144. In rem state jurisdiction was premised on CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11470
(West 1991).
59. 866 F.2d at 1144. Although the circumstances of the federal seizure were unclear, the court
surmised that some type of "cooperative arrangement" was in effect between the state and federal law
enforcement authorities. Id.
60. Id. at 1145.
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had approved the DEA seizure, the court noted that the rule of Penn
General promotes harmony between courts, not bureaucrats.6'
2. Prior Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
In recent decisions, federal courts generally have not found encroachment
on state jurisdiction when federal adoption of a state law enforcement
seizure occurs prior to the initiation of a forfeiture action in state court.
The Eighth Circuit ruled in accordance with this principle in United States
v. $12,390.00.62 In $12,390.00, although no state court forfeiture
proceeding had commenced, local law enforcement officers had executed
a search warrant issued by a state court and subsequently filed a return of
warrant with the same court listing currency as having been seized. 3 On
this basis, the claimants maintained that the state court acquired exclusive
jurisdiction.' 4 Dismissing this interpretation, the court reasoned that the
absence of state forfeiture proceedings, coupled with the lack of state
custody over the res,65 militated in favor of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion.66 By condoning the federal adoption initiated without the consent
or knowledge of the state court, the Eighth Circuit implicitly authorized the
local police department's end run around state jurisdiction.'
61. Id. The Ninth Circuit was similarly unpersuaded by the district court's possession of the res.
Id. See also United States v. $2,542.00, 754 F. Supp. 378, 380 (D. Vt. 1990). In $2,542.00, the federal
district court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction because, regardless of the Vermont State
Police's decision to have the forfeiture adopted by federal authorities, a motion for dismissal was
pending in state court. Id. at 382-83. According to David Smith, "Ithis decision gives claimants an
unwarranted incentive to race to the state courthouse with a Rule 41(e) motion before a state police
seizure is 'adopted' by the feds." See 1 SMITH, supra note 35, 9.01 at 9-30.
62. 956 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1992).
63. Id. at 805.
64. Id.
65. After federal administrative forfeiture proceedings had commenced, but five months prior to
the filing of a federal forfeiture claim, the state court heard and granted claimants' motion for return
of the property. Id. at 803.
66. Id. at 805-06. The court relied on the analogous Missouri Court of Appeals decision in
Conrod v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 810 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). In Conrod, the
claimant sought the return of $10,750 seized during a traffic stop when a narcotics dog signaled the
presence of drugs on the currency. 810 S.W.2d at 616. The state police subsequently turned the money
over to DEA to commence federal forfeiture proceedings. Id. The court concluded that because no
Missouri court had assumed jurisdiction over the currency, the state circuit court was without
jurisdiction to rule on claimant's motion for summary judgment. Thus, the adoption was proper. Id.
at 617.
67. The decision in $12,390.00 significantly undermines the authority of state courts to determine
the disposition of assets seized within their jurisdiction. The state court was unaware that federal
forfeiture proceedings had been initiated until claimants brought their motion. 956 F.2d at 803. For
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/40
19941 MISSOURI DRUG FORFEITURE STATUTE 1479
In United States v. Certain Real Property,6 the Sixth Circuit reempha-
sized that the filing of a forfeiture claim in state court is crucial to the
determination of whether the state can assert exclusive jurisdiction over
forfeited assets. The court upheld federal adoption of seized real property,
even though adoption took place after the state took affirmative steps that
triggered administrative, though not judicial, forfeiture proceedings under
Michigan law.69  In Certain Real Property, the police seized the
claimant's home because he had remodeled the attic for the purpose of
cultivating marijuana.70  The court rejected the claimant's contention that
receipt of notice that the state had seized his property pursuant to Michigan
law was sufficient to establish state jurisdiction.71 Even though compulso-
ry state forfeiture proceedings were underway,72 the Sixth Circuit ruled
that the federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction because there
were no actions pending against the property in state court at the time of
a discussion of this problem under Louisiana law, see infra notes 84-89.
As part of its discussion of the jurisdictional issue, the court rejected the government's claim that,
because the res was no longer within the jurisdiction of the district court, the Eighth Circuit lacked
jurisdiction. 956 F.2d at 803-05. Abandoning the traditional notion that failure to preserve the res
results in the loss ofjurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit concluded that appellate jurisdiction was proper for
several reasons. Id. at 803-04. First, it is fundamentally unfair to allow the government to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court and then avoid appellate review of a favorable holding. Second, the res in this
case, currency, is fungible and a portion of it remained in the possession of the United States. Third,
the remainder of the money was distributed to the St. Louis Police Department, which cannot be
considered an innocent purchaser because it conducted the initial seizure. Thus, the DEA could seek
return of the money from the St. Louis Police Department, or in the alternative, compensate claimants
with money from the Asset Forfeiture Fund. Id. at 804-05.
68. 986 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1993).
69. Id. at 994.
70. Id. at 992. Although beyond the scope of this Recent Development, there are numerous
unresolved issues relating to the subject of real property forfeiture, including the resale of forfeited
property and the residual interest of innocent owners. For discussion of these and other related issues,
see generally Paul DeBole, Forfeiture Under Drug Law Raises Tax, Title Issues, MICH. LAW. WKLY.,
July 27, 1992, at 28 (discussing issues presented in the resale of forfeited property, including good title,
title insurance, and real estate tax issues); Alice Marie O'Brien, Note, "Caught in the Crossfire".
Protecting the Innocent Owner of Real Property From Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7),
65 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 521 (1991); Brad A. Chapman & Kenneth W. Pearson, Comment, The Drug
War and Real Estate Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881: The "Innocent" Lienholder's Rights, 21 TEx.
TECH. L. Rsv. 2127 (1990).
71. Certain Real Property, 986 F.2d at 993.
72. Real property is subject to forfeiture under MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7521 (West 1992).
After notice of seizure has been provided to the property owner, Michigan law requires that the agency
responsible for the seizure promptly notify the county prosecutor of the seizure. Id. § 333.7523(1)(b).
After the claimant has filed a claim and a cost bond, or where no bond is filed after 20 days, the
prosecutor must "promptly institute forfeiture proceedings" in state court. Id. §§ 333.7523 (1)(c),
(1)(d), (3).
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the adoption.7" Since the federal district court was the only court
"attempting to exercise" jurisdiction over the res, federal adoption of the
property was appropriate.74
3. State Statutory Jurisdiction
Frustrated by the federal courts' refusal to recognize state forfeiture
jurisdiction in the absence of a formal state court forfeiture action, states
developed a variety of statutory schemes designed to secure state jurisdic-
tion over the res.75 However, the Fourth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education6 raises
significant doubts as to the effectiveness of these state statutes. In Winston-
Salem, the Fourth Circuit upheld the transfer of $10,638 in forfeited
currency from the Winston-Salem Police Department to the DEA against
challenges based on two distinct provisions of North Carolina law."
First, the court limited the application of a North Carolina constitutional
provision which seemingly required that all forfeiture proceeds be used for
public education. 7' The court noted that the provision specifically referred
to forfeitures resulting from "any breach of the penal laws of the state," and
distinguished federal adoptive seizures arising from violations of federal
law.79  Because the Winston-Salem Police Department initially seized the
73. The court stated:
Therefore, it is the filing of the forfeiture complaint in the state court which brings the res
within the jurisdiction of the state courts. We reject the contention that receipt of 'notice of
seizure' from the seizing agency translates into the state court's exercise of jurisdiction over
the claimant's real property.
986 F.2d at 994.
74. Id. at 994 (citing $12,390.00, 956 F.2d at 801; One 1986 Chevrolet Van, 927 F.2d at 44; One
1985 Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d at 1146). In its analysis, the Certain Real Property court stressed that
the lack of a forfeiture action in state court precludes the assertion of state jurisdiction. 986 F.2d at
994. This conclusion is in accord with the authorities cited above. However, it ignores the fact that
but for the federal adoption, the property would definitely have been forfeited under state law. MICH.
COMp. LAW ANN. § 333.7523(1) (West 1992). Under the Eighth Circuit's holding in $12,390.00, this
appropriation of state jurisdiction constitutes encroachment regardless ofwhether a state forfeiture action
has formally been filed. 956 F.2d at 805.
75. See supra notes 5, 41.
76. 902 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1990).
77. Id. at 273.
78. Id. The North Carolina Constitution provides: "iT]he clear proceeds of all penalties and
forfeitures and of all fines collected in the several counties for any breach of the penal laws of the State,
shall belong to and remain in the several counties, and shall be faithfully appropriated and used
exclusively for maintaining free public schools." N.C. CoNST. art. IX, § 7.
79. Winston-Salem, 902 F.2d at 273. The Fourth Circuit was influenced by a North Carolina
Supreme Court decision, State ex rel. Thornburg v. Currency in the Amount of $52,029.00, 78 S.E.2d
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currency based on federal drug violations, the court determined that the
proceeds were not subject to North Carolina's educational funding
directive."0
Second, the Fourth Circuit, when determining the validity of the
adoption, refused to consider the police departments' alleged violation of
state law.81 The Board of Education alleged that by transferring the
forfeited assets to the DEA, the police department violated a state statute
which required that seized property be retained for evidentiary purposes.8"
Citing earlier forfeiture cases, the court held that the federal government's
authority to adopt a seizure does not depend on the authority of the initial
agency to transfer the property. 3 Accordingly, the court upheld the
adoption without addressing the state law issue. The sweeping federal
adoptive power conferred by the Fourth Circuit may be limited, however,
if state law explicitly provides for exclusive state jurisdiction over
forfeitures.
In Scarabin v. Drug Enforcement Administration,4 the Fifth Circuit
held that under Louisiana law, state court jurisdiction commences at the
moment of seizure and continues until it is affirmatively relinquished."
In Scarabin the plaintiff sought the return of $12,360 in cash seized by the
local sheriffs office during a drug search pursuant to a state court warrant.
The sheriffs office then sought adoption of the seizure by transferring a
1, 6 (N.C. 1989), and an opinion by the North Carolina Attorney General, 47 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 1
(1988), both holding that § 7 of the state Constitution applied only to forfeitures resulting from penal
violation of North Carolina law. 902 F.2d at 273.
80. Id. at 273.
81. Id. at 272.
82. Id. The Board's statutory claim was premised on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-11.1(a) which
provides that property seized by a state or local law enforcement officer must be kept "under the
direction of the court or magistrate as long as necessary to assure that the property will be produced
at and may be used as evidence in any trial." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-11.1(a) (1993).
83. 902 F.2d at 272. The Fourth Circuit relied on United States v. One Ford Coupe Auto, 272
U.S, 321, 325 (1926) ("It is settled that where property declared by a federal statute to be forfeited
because used in violation of federal law is seized by one having no authority to do so, the United States
may adopt the seizure with the same effect as if it had originally been made by one duly authorized.");
and United States v. One 1956 Ford Tudor Sedan, 253 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1958). Winston-Salem,
902 F.2d 272.
84. 966 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1992).
85. Id. at 993. State court jurisdiction was based on article 167 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure, which provides:
When property is seized pursuant to a search warrant, it shall be retained under the direction
of the judge. If seized property is not to be used as evidence or is no longer needed as
evidence, it shall be disposed of according to law, under the direction of the judge.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 167 (West 1991).
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cashier's check for the amount seized to the DEA. The Scarabin court
vigorously criticized the federal government's handling of the forfeiture,
86
and, because the DEA never had actual possession over the claimant's
currency, rejected the DEA's contention that the res was forfeited
administratively.87 Expressing its displeasure with the attempt of the
sheriffs office to circumvent Louisiana law,88  the court found the
equitable sharing arrangement to be an unsanctioned encroachment on state
law. 9 Although the Fifth Circuit, applying Penn General, validated
preexisting state jurisdiction, neither the Scarabin court nor the Louisiana
statute purported to prohibit federal adoption of state forfeitures altogeth-
er.
90
III. MIssouRi FORFEITURE LAW
Spurred by perceived abuses of existing state forfeiture statutes, 9' and
perpetually outpaced in the "unseemly race to the res,"92 Missouri recently
enacted stringent new forfeiture provisions. If upheld against expected
legal challenges, these new provisions will profoundly affect future
86. Thie court was incensed that even after all state charges against Scambin were dismissed, he
was nevertheless forced by the DEA to appear before the Fifth Circuit on three separate occasions. 966
F.2d at 995.
87. The sheriff's office turned over a check, rather than cash, which constituted the actual res, to
the DEA in a vain attempt to establish in rem jurisdiction. Id. at 991. The court held that because the
DEA never possessed the actual res, it did not have in rem jurisdiction. Id. at 990 ("In sum: no funds,
ergo no forfeiture, ergo no jurisdiction. Q.E.D.").
88. Id. at 991. Louisiana law would have required the sheriff's office to return the $12,360 to
Scarabin. However, on the same day that the state court ordered that the property be seized pursuant
to its warrant, the sheriffs office surrendered the cashier's check to the DEA for adoption "without the
knowledge, much less the authority, of the state court." id.
89. Id. The court was also upset by the apparent deception with which the arrangement was
undertaken. Id. ("NFL sportscasters might call the handoff from the Sheriff's Office to the DEA,
followed by the lateral back from the DEA to the Sheriff's Office, a 'flea-flicker' play.").
90. See 1 SMITH, supra note 35, 9.01 at 9-29 (commenting that no state forfeiture statute
attempts to invalidate federal adoptions because doing so "would throw into question the legal basis for
thousands of federal forfeiture cases-a result that neither the states nor the federal government could
abide').
91. The St. Louis Post Dispatch ran a series of articles criticizing the perceived abuse of forfeiture
proceedings in Missouri that contributed to the Missouri Legislature's enactment of new forfeiture
legislation. See, e.g., Tim Poor & Louis J. Rose, Forfeiture Scrutiny Brings Change, ST. LOUIS POST
DISPATCH, Dec. 29, 1991, at IA; Tim Poor & Louis J. Rose, Forfeiture "Adoption" Policy May Rob
Citizen of Due Process, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Dec. 17, 1991, at 7A; Tim Poor & Louis J. Rose,
Paralyzed Student May Lose His Car for Possessing $40 Worth of Drugs, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH,
Dec. 15, 1991, at IA; Tim Poor & Louis J. Rose, Officer Seizes Sports Car, Ends Up As Its New
Owner, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, May 5, 1991, at IA.
92. United States v. Alston, 717 F. Supp. 378, 380 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
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forfeiture actions in Missouri, and possibly elsewhere.
On July 13, 1993, Governor Mel Carnahan signed Missouri House Bill
No. 562 into law.93 This legislation represents a bold effort on the part
of Missouri lawmakers to assert control over assets forfeited in Missouri. 4
Like the Louisiana statute addressed in Scarabin,95 the Missouri statute
vests control of any res seized pursuant to state authority in the pertinent
state court from the moment of seizure.96 However, the Missouri statute
significantly enlarges the scope of state jurisdiction by including "any
property seized by state or local peace or reserve officers who are detached
to, deputized or commissioned by or working in conjunction with [a]
federal agency .... 9'
93. The Missouri Legislature voted to enact the new state forfeiture provisions despite the issuance
by the Department of Justice of a new adoptive forfeiture policy designed to allay the concerns of state
lawmakers. The new federal policy requires that state or local seizures that are part of ongoing state
investigations or prosecutions should be pursued in state court absent specific circumstances that may
make federal forfeiture more appropriate. Such factors include: (1) inadequate state laws or forfeiture
experience, (2) unique management or disposition problems requiring the assistance of the U.S.
Marshals Service (e.g., property or businesses), (3) significant delay causing diminution in value of asset
or adverse effect on innocent owner of asset, and (4) if for any reason, the pertinent prosecutor declines
to initiate state forfeiture proceedings. CARY H. COPELAND, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DIRECTIVE
No. 92-1 (Jan. 15, 1993), reprinted in SMiTH, supra note 35, at 7-44 to 7-45.
94. For the text of the new provision, see infra notes 96-97.
One possible motivation for Missouri's new forfeiture legislation may have been the serious impact
on state coffers arising from the Eighth Circuit's decision in $12,390.00. See discussion supra notes
62-67 and accompanying text. That decision enabled Missouri law enforcement agencies to successfully
prevent the sharing of any forfeiture proceeds seized by its own agents with other state agencies. Id.
95. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
96. Missouri's new anti-adoption provision states:
No state or local law enforcement agency may transfer any property seized by the state or
local agency to any federal agency for forfeiture under federal law until the prosecuting
attorney and the circuit judge of the county in which the property was seized first review the
seizure and approve the transfer to a federal agency. The prosecuting attorney and the circuit
judge shall not approve any transfer unless it reasonably appears the activity giving rise to
the investigation or seizure involves more than one state or the nature of the investigation or
seizure would be better pursued under federal forfeiture statutes. No transfer shall be made
to a federal agency unless the violation would be a felony under Missouri law or federal law.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.647(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994). The new statutory provisions also include
additional forfeiture reforms. Section 513.647(2) sets forth procedural, evidentiary, and notification
requirements that must be followed prior to a transfer. Section 513.651 restricts the use of forfeited
funds to "investigation or prosecution of criminal activity, the execution of court orders arising from
such activity, the enforcement of drug-related crimes, training, drug education, and the safety of both
the citizens and law enforcement officers." Section 516.653 further requires that law enforcement
agencies receiving funds from federal forfeitures must acquire an independent audit of the proceeds
received and provide a copy of the audit to the state auditor's office.
97. Section 513.649 provides in full: "Any property seized by state or local peace or reserve
officers who are detached to, deputized or commissioned by or working in conjunction with the federal
agency shall remain subject to the provisions of this section and sections 513.647 and 513.651." Mo.
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This provision is unique among state forfeiture statutes in that it
encroaches upon the powers vested in state and local police operating under
the authority of federal statute.9" Specifically, it appears to encompass
seizures conducted pursuant to federal judicial search warrants or as part
of a federal investigation, so long as the seizures were conducted by state
or local law enforcement personnel. Given this seeming encroachment,
significant questions exist as to the validity of Missouri's forfeiture statute
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
IV. SUPREMACY CLAUSE PREEMPTION
The Supremacy Clause99 binds the judges of every state to the laws of
the United States and permits Congress to preempt state law.00 In
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,'' the Supreme Court identified the
three ways in which federal law may preempt state law: (1) if Congress
expresses a clear intent to preempt state law; (2) if Congress intends to
occupy an entire field of law; and (3) if due to an inherent conflict,
compliance with both state and federal law is impossible. 2  Although a
federal and a state statute may regulate a particular field of law jointly, the
federal statute trumps any state law with which it conflicts. 3
In the area of federal forfeiture, Congress has not hesitated to exercise
its preemption power."w The federal statute addressing the application
of state law in forfeiture contexts, 21 U.S.C. § 903, is analogous to the
third prong of the Capital Cities test.t"' Section 903 requires application
ANN. STAT. § 513.649 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
98. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the authority of the DEA
to deputize state and local law enforcement officers.
99. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.").
100. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824).
101. 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
102. Id. at 699.
103. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977).
104. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(c) (1988) (providing that assets seized for violation of federal drug
statutes "shall be deemed to be in the custody of the Attorney General, subject only to the orders and
decrees of the court or official having jurisdiction thereof").
105. Section 903 provides:
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the
Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties,
to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within
the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this
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of state law unless the state law "positively conflicts" with the federal
statute. 10 6 Even under this relatively relaxed standard, certain provisions
of Missouri's new forfeiture statute may be vulnerable to preemption under
§ 903.
The DEA is responsible for the development and implementation of
federal drug laws and for the enforcement of those laws in cooperation with
state and local governments." 7 In addition, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 878,
the DEA Administrator may delegate certain of the powers and functions
vested in him to state and local law enforcement officers. 08 By statutori-
ly granting this authority, Congress intended to implement an effective drug
enforcement program utilizing the coordinated efforts of federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies."0 9
Section 513.649 of Missouri's forfeiture statute"0 extends the jurisdic-
tion of the state provisions to property seized by state and local law
enforcement agencies, potentially including situations in which these
agencies are acting under a federal drug enforcement program. Thus, this
provision directly conflicts with 21 U.S.C. § 878,"' because it attempts
to regulate the same state and local police officers on which the federal
provision bestows superseding federal authority. Congress intended to
promote participation of federal, state, and local law enforcement officers
in multi-jurisdictional drug task forces when it enacted § 878.212
Missouri's statute is a direct effort to circumvent this intent, and thus, is
subject to preemption.
Although section 513.649 of the Missouri statute is subject to preemp-
tion, § 903 should not apply to section 513.647 of Missouri's forfeiture
provision."' Section 513.647, like the Louisiana statute considered in
subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.
21 U.S.C. § 903 (1988) (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. Subpart R-Drug Enforcement Administration, 28 C.F.R. § 0.101(a) (1993).
108. Section 878 provides in pertinent part:
Any officer or employee of the Drug Enforcement Administration or any State or local law
enforcement officer designated by the Attorney General may ... execute and serve search
warrants ... issued under the authority of the United States; ... make seizures of property
* and perform such other law enforcement duties as the Attorney General may designate.
21 U.S.C. § 878(a)(2), (4), (5) (1988) (emphasis added).
109. See H.R. REP. 1444,91st Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, at 52 (1970) (calling for "cooperation between
all of the Federal enforcement authorities and the State and local enforcement authorities").
110. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 108.
112. See supra note 109.
113. See supra note 96.
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Scarabin,"14 permissibly provides for exclusive state jurisdiction from the
moment of seizure premised upon the notion of judicial harmony set forth
in Penn GeneraL" Under the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction,
this provision can coexist with the federal forfeiture provisions. Because
it does not directly conflict with federal law, section 513.647 should not be
subject to preemption.
IV. CONCLUSION
Where, as here, a positive conflict exists between state and federal law,
the Supremacy Clause requires the application of federal law. Missouri's
forfeiture provision, at least to the extent that it interferes with the ability
of the federal government to delegate authority to state and local law
enforcement agencies, should be preempted to avoid frustrating the anti-
crime objectives of the federal forfeiture laws.
Preemption does not end Missouri's ability to get state jurisdiction. The
preemption of section 513.649 does not upset the precedent of Penn
General Nor does 21 U.S.C. § 903 prevent a state from asserting prior
exclusive jurisdiction over assets seized pursuant to state authority. It
merely prevents a state from impermissibly encroaching upon the sphere of
federal authority granted in 21 U.S.C. § 878 and guaranteed by the
Supremacy Clause. Existing Department of Justice guidelines and policies
regulating adoptive forfeitures'1 6 already adequately safeguard Missouri's
interest in forfeiture proceeds. Thus, there is little need for Missouri's
aggressive, and arguably unconstitutional, legislation.
Frans J. von Kaenel
114. 966 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1992). See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 93.
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